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Market Depth, Liquidity and
the Effect of Dual Trading in Futures Markets
ABSTRACT
This paper examines market depth and other characteristics of the liquidity of the S&P
500 index futures market and how they were affected by a restriction on dual trading imposed
by the CME's top-step rule. We find that the S&P 500 futures is a deep market and that the rule
did not have a significant impact on its liquidity. Specifically, the rule did not affect (1) the
behavior of stock and futures prices surrounding large futures trades, (2) the extent to which the
index futures are mispriced relative to their theoretical prices, and (3) the ability of dual trading
brokers to provide liquidity during periods of high trading volume. Finally, the restriction on
dual trading had no effect on price volatility.

Market Depth, Liquidity and
the Effect of Dual Trading in Futures Markets
I. Introduction
Regulatory concern about dual trading in the futures markets was spurred by the market
crash of October, 1987 but the practice has long been controversial. Dual trading refers to the
practice of brokers trading for their personal accounts in addition to trading for their customers
in the same securities 1 . Proponents of dual trading point to the benefits of enhanced market
liquidity through lower bid-ask spreads and lower transactions costs. Opponents emphasize the
potential for a conflict of interest between dual trading brokers and their customers and thus a
lessening of market integrity. 2 Although the Chicago Mercantile Exchange banned dual trading
in all active contracts effective May 20, 1991, as part of a market reform package, the exchange
now faces growing resentment over the ban, with floor brokers and the locals on opposite sides
of the debate3 . This points to the importance of finding empirical evidence regarding the effect
^is trading practice had been pervasive across securities markets until it was banned in the
futures markets in 1991. See Grossman (1989) for a detailed description of the practice of dual
trading in the securities markets in the U.S. and other countries.
2For example, suppose a broker receives a large buy order from his customer. If he expects
the price to go up when the customer's order is executed, he may buy the security on his own
account before he executes his customer's order. The broker profits from this illegal "front
running" if the price goes up later as expected after his customer's order is executed. To
minimize the trading abuse of brokers, the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission)
has used "thirty minutes time bracketing" regulation for futures contracts which requires all
brokers to report every thirty minutes all relevant transactions-related information.
3The floor brokers claim that, stripped of the opportunity to dual trade, they have lost an
important source of income and that market liquidity has been weakened while locals contend
that the ban puts them on a more equal footing with the brokers in bidding business from
customers and that liquidity has remained intact. See Chicago Tribune, February 4, 1992 and
1
of dual trading on various market characteristics.
This paper investigates the liquidity of the S&P 500 index futures market and tests
whether the liquidity is affected by the restriction on dual trading activity such as the CME's
top-step rule4 (made effective on June 21, 1987). In measuring liquidity, we examine various
market characteristics such as market depth, trading volume and transactions, high-low price
spreads and brokers' participation rate. In estimating market depth, we distinguish between any
permanent price effects caused by informationally motivated large trades and temporary
mispricings due to the impact of large trades on market makers' inventory carrying costs.
The results show that the S&P 500 futures market is a liquid market and that it remains
so even after the promulgation of the top-step rule. The rule caused some reduction in both the
dual trading volume and the number of transactions by dual trading brokers. However, the
behavior of stock and futures prices surrounding large futures trades show no significant impact
from the rule. Similarly, while there is underpricing of the index futures, there is no additional
mispricing due to the rule change. Nor do we find any relationship between dual trading and
price volatility (as measured by the high-low price spread). We also find that the dual traders
are more likely to be active as brokers in periods of relatively high volume. But, again, the top-
the Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1992 for articles concerning the controversy.
4According to the special executive report of the CME, the top-step rule (Rule 541) states:
A member, who has executed an S&P 500futures contract order while on the top step of the
S&P 500futures pit, shall not thereafter on the same day trade S&P 500futures contractsfor
his account. As stated in the special report of the CME to the CFTC, the major reason for
applying the top-step rule only to the S&P 500 futures was the growing public concern over the
relation between the spot index and its futures prices. The relation had often been out of the line
prior to June 1987 and the exchange had been pressed to restrict dual trading.
step rule has no effect on the timing of their brokerage activities.
To our knowledge, this paper represents the first study to examine market depth of the
futures market and the effect of dual trading on market depth. As a by-product, we examine the
impact of large futures trades on the spot market, which has been controversial. Concerning the
effect of dual trading on market liquidity, previous empirical studies have examined mostly the
bid-ask spreads. They have found a negative relation between dual trading and either the bid-ask
spread (e.g., Walsh and Dinehart (1991) and Smith and Whaley (1990b)) or execution costs
(Stanley (1981) and Grossman (1990b)). In particular, Smith and Whaley (1990b) find a
significant increase in the effective bid/ask spread after the implementation of the top-step rule.
It is our claim that market liquidity is not determined by the spread alone. In fact, as
discussed in Ho and Macris (1985) and Vijh (1990), one should expect any trading rule to result
in a trade-off between its impact on market depth and its impact on the spread. This argument
implies that, to get a complete picture of the effect of any dual trading regulation on liquidity,
both market depth and the bid-ask spread should be examined. Thus, our study can be viewed
as complementing the existing literature focusing on the bid-ask spread. This point is elaborated
further in section II, which also contains a review of the existing literature.
Section EI describes the data and the econometric methodology for the tests to be
performed. Section IV discusses the liquidity of the S&P 500 index futures market and section
V demonstrates the effect of dual trading on the liquidity. Section VI concludes.
II. Literature Review and Theoretical Background
Most previous studies of dual trading use the bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity of
the market. 5 However, Ho and Macris (1985) suggest that "trading rules often result in a trade-
off between a tighter market-spread and a more liquid market." In other words, there is an
inverse relationship between the effective spread and the market "depth". 6
The intuition behind this hypothesis is as follows: suppose that the top step rule results
in a wider bid-ask spread of the S&P 500 futures.7 This will increase revenues to exclusive
brokers (and dual traders who switch to being exclusive brokers). Additional market makers will
be attracted to the S&P 500 pit by the more attractive profit margins. Thus, market makers'
aggregate inventory carrying capacity will increase and so the market's ability to absorb large
orders will be enhanced.
Opposing this tendency will be the fact that some brokers who previously engaged in dual
trading may prefer to leave the S&P 500 pit and engage in dual trading elsewhere on the floor.
If these dual traders act, as suggested by Grossman (1989), like "a reserve group of market
makers" by adding liquidity when customer orders are large, then the top step rule may lead to
a reduction in market depth.
5Grossman and Miller (1988) point out that the bid-ask spread can be misleading as a
measure of liquidity unless buy and sell orders arrive simultaneously. They stress using the
impact of large orders on prices as a measure of liquidity. This criticism may not be relevant
for the S&P 500 futures market, where trading is quite active.
6Vijh (1990) confirms this relationship empirically for the Chicago Board of Option
Exchange equity options.
7Grossman (1989) argues that the elimination of dual trading will increase bid-ask spreads
because "the risk capital made available by floor traders who act as market makers" will be
reduced.
Formal models of dual trading are developed by Fishman and Longstaff (1992), Roell
(1991) and Sarkar (1992). In Roell (1991), dual traders are able to identify a portion of liquidity
trades. The effect is to increase the proportional impact of informed trades on the total order
flow, worsening the market maker's adverse selection problem. Thus, a market with dual trading
has lower depth. In Fishman and Longstaff (1992), the dual traders have imperfect private
information as to whether their customers are informed or not, and the dual traders' optimal
strategy is to mimic their informed customers. The effect is to widen the bid-ask spread. In
Sarkar (1992), the order size is a variable and so informed customers rationally anticipate the
dual trader's mimicking strategy. In equilibrium, there is a reduction in informed trading volume
which is exactly offset by the positive dual trading volume, leaving total trading volume and thus
market depth unaffected by the presence of the dual trader.
Overall, the implications of the existing theoretical models are mixed for the impact of
dual trading on liquidity. In all these models, however, the number of brokers and market
makers is fixed. So the possible adverse effects of the ban in reducing the number of brokers
and market makers cannot be analyzed. Further, Roell (1991) and Sarkar (1992) both model a
batch market and so the distinction between the spread and the depth is difficult to make
formally. Therefore, it will be of particular importance to examine empirically the effects of any
dual trading regulation on both the spread as well as the depth. By studying the impact of the
top step rule on market depth, this paper hopes to complement the existing research focusing on
bid-ask spreads.
There are several empirical studies which test the relationship between dual trading
activity and market liquidity by examining the bid-ask spread only. For example, after the
implementation of the top-step rule, Smith and Whaley (1990b) find a significant increase in the
effective bid-ask spread after controlling for changing risk and trading volume. The increase is
greater for more distant futures contracts whose trading volumes are very low.
A study by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (1989) shows that dual trading
brokers do not provide better execution costs (as measured by the average bid-ask spread over
a five minute interval) to their customers relative to exclusive brokers. Walsh and Dinehart
(1991) point out that the CFTC's estimate of the bid-ask spread uses the average absolute price
changes which is one tick (a constant) for most of their observations, and thus the CFTC's
measure of the bid-ask spread is faulty. Further, the CFTC's study combines different markets
into a single regression analysis which forces the relationship between trading activity and the
spread to be the same across all markets. Walsh and Dinehart control for several of these
factors and find,, using wheat, soybean and MMI futures markets for three weeks in the fourth
quarter of 1988, that dual trading narrows the bid-ask spread and so enhances liquidity in some
markets. Finally, Stanley (1981) shows, through a simulation, that dual trading would lead to
a decrease of brokerage fees and faster execution of customer orders.
In summary, previous studies have mainly focused upon a relationship between dual
trading and some estimate of the bid-ask spread. They have mostly found that dual trading is
associated with lower bid-ask spreads. One of our contributions in this paper lies in emphasizing
market depth or the price impact of large trades and showing, at least for our sample, that a
restriction in dual trading activities is not harmful to the maintenance of deep markets.
m. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
Three sets of data are used in this study. First, we use the CME's Computerized Trade
Reconstruction (CTR) data for two years, June 22, 1986 to June 21, 1988 with the inception of
the Top- Step Rule falling in the middle of the sample period. This file contains, for each trade,
the customer type, trade type, the number of contracts traded and prices but dated only by the
half-hour. The customer type is classified as four indicators with respect to the floor brokers or
floor traders according to Regulation 1.35 of the Commodity Exchange Act. CTI 1 refers to
brokers trading for their own account; CTI 2 to brokers trading for their clearing members'
house account; CTI 3 to trading for another member present on the exchange floor or an account
controlled by such other members; and CTI 4 for trading for any other type of customers.
Second, we use the CME's time and sales data which contain the time and price of each
S&P futures transaction. This data base includes only transactions with price changes as reported
for futures contracts and the value of the spot index. Finally, to construct theoretical futures
prices, we obtained the S&P 500 stock index quotes, dividend yields from the CRSP value-
weighted index and daily interest rate data for T-bills from the Data Resources Inc. 8
B. Methodology
First, we construct estimates of the price impact of large futures trades ("market depth")
and second, we estimate the effect of the top-step rule on market depth. Our estimates of market
8This proxy for the S&P 500 dividend yield has been used by several other researchers as
well (e.g., see MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988.)
depth are based upon the methodology used by Vijh (1990) for the CBOE equity options. The
potential price impact of large trades can be either of a permanent or a temporary nature. If
large futures trades are carried out because informed traders have superior information about
future stock prices, then this should lead to a permanent change in both stock and futures prices
surrounding large futures trades. On the other hand, if large futures trades cause additional
inventory carrying costs for market makers, then this should cause a temporary deviation of the
market futures price from its theoretical price. Also, since the magnitude of the deviation
depends upon transactions costs (sum of commission costs in the stock and futures markets plus
market impact costs of putting the trades initially), estimating the deviation would be an indirect
way of measuring the effect on transactions costs.
To estimate market depth, we first identify "large" futures trades and the time brackets
in which they occur. A large trade is defined in the following way. The average volume per
transaction (ATV) is defined as the ratio of total volume to the total number of transactions for
each time bracket9 . For each of the two trade types (buys and sales), a large trade for that type
is defined as a trade (ATV) one standard deviation greater than that trade type's daily mean for
the entire two year sample period.
If large futures trades are motivated by superior information about the underlying stocks,
then stock prices surrounding the large futures trade should be permanently affected. Denote the
half-hour time bracket in which the j-th large futures trade occurs as the j-th interval. Let S^ be
'The reason we construct a measure of average volume instead of just working with the raw
volume variable is that, since trades are only dated by the half-hour, when more than one trade
occurs within a half-hour bracket these cannot be time-ordered. In contrast, there is just one
value of ATV per half-hour bracket.
the spot price (midpoint of the last quote) of the S&P 500 stock index just before the beginning
of the j-th interval- Then r
t ,
the average spot price relative to S
oj , is:
rt = IWCVbSJ (1)
where n is the number of large futures trades and Sg is the stock price t minutes from the
beginning of the j-th interval. For each t, rt should be equal to 1 (ignoring a small return for a
few minutes) if large futures trades were not information-based. r
t
should increase (decrease)
with t if traders have information that the spot index will increase (decrease) 10 .
r
t
is calculated for values of t ranging from 15 minutes before to 15 minutes after the
beginning of the j-th interval. For example, suppose only two large trades occur in the sample
(n=2), one in the 10-10.30 AM bracket and the other in the 3-3.30 PM bracket. If we set t=-15
minutes, then r_i5 is calculated by first taking the ratios of the spot prices at 9.45 AM and 2.45
PM to the spot prices just before 10 AM and 3 PM, respectively, and then averaging the two
ratios. r
t
is calculated for time periods before the j-th interval in this way to reflect the
possibility that the market may learn about a large trade before it actually occurs.
If a large futures trade is information based, it may also have a permanent effect on the
surrounding futures prices. This effect is estimated by the statistic ft which measures the average
futures price relative to F^, the market futures price just before the j-th interval. ft is defined in
identical fashion to r
t, with the futures prices replacing the spot prices.
10A potential problem with this test is that we do not know exactly when the j-th trade occurs
within the half-hour bracket. This is because of the way the CTR data is constructed. If it occurs
towards the end of the j-th interval, then S^ will be a stale price. So we repeat the test, but
calculate the average spot price relative to S
cj , the spot index price just after the j-th interval.
The second reference point S
cj is meant to capture the information effect of large trades
occurring towards the end of the j-th interval.
A large futures trade may also cause a temporary divergence between the market futures
price and its theoretical price if it increases market makers' inventory carrying costs. To estimate
this "inventory" effect for a futures contract expiring at time T, define the "mispricing" variable
Xgr as follows
11
:
x,t = PV - S^^/Soj (2)
where F^ is the market price of the futures contract t minutes from the beginning of the j-th
interval, S^ is the index value, and r and d represent the risk-free rate and the dividend rate,
respectively. We choose stock index quotes 30 minutes apart (the limits chosen to coincide with
those of the half-hour brackets in the CTR data) so that the mispricing variable is defined for
half-hour intervals. Averaging over all large trades:
mrr = Sj=?(Vn) (3)
where n is the number of large futures trades.
After measuring the liquidity of the S&P 500 futures market, we test whether the top-step
rule has a significant impact on the liquidity. Following Fishman and Longstaff(1992), Dual
trading volume is identified with member trading volume (customer type indicators or CTI codes
1,2 and 3) and nondual trading volume with public trading volume (CTI code 4)12 . The average
per transaction dual trading volume (ADTV) is proxied by the ratio of member volume to the
number of member transactions for each time bracket. The average non-dual trading volume
nIn our tests, we only consider nearby contracts, which have the highest trading volumes.
12We have repeated our tests with a narrower definition of dual trades by using trades
identified under CTI code 1 only - as in the CFTC (1989) study. This does not change any of
our results materially. The results will be available upon request from the authors.
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(ANTV) is similarly defined. Then, for each of the four trade types (dual buys and sales;
nondual buys and sales), a large trade for that type is defined as a trade (ADTV or ANTV) one
standard deviation greater than that trade type's daily mean for the entire two year sample
period.
The sample period is divided into three sub-periods - period 1 for the pre-rule-change
regime (6/22/86-6/21/87), period 2 for the post-change but pre-crash situation (6/22/87-
10/18/87) and period 3 for the post-crash interval (10/19/87-6/21/88). To test the significance
of changes in market depth, if any, among the three sample periods, we run the dummy
regressions for both r
t
and mtT . For example, for mlT , we estimate the following equation:
n\r = oc + aA! + a2D,2 + e t (4)
where D„ = 1 for sample two (post rule change and pre-crash) and zero otherwise and Da = 1
for sample three (post-crash) and otherwise. Under the null hypothesis, o^ and a2 are zero.
If a i is significantly less (greater) than zero, then depth is higher (lower) in the dual trading
regime. 13
In addition to testing the price impact of large futures trades, we also estimate their effect
on price volatility. Using the high-low spread as a measure of price volatility, we perform two
tests: first, we count the number of occurrences for which the j-th interval's high-low spread is
increased or decreased relative to the previous day's median spread. This allows us to examine
13In estimating the change in market depth due to the top step rule, we do not control for
other factors which may influence depth. This is not to say that other factors are absent, but that
there is no reason to believe that they may have changed in any systematic way between our
three sample periods. To check this, we repeated our tests using only a six week period before
and after the rule change date. The qualitative nature of our results remain the same.
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whether high volume days are generally associated with increased price volatility. Second, we
compute the statistic pt , defined as:
pt = Sj=?(Prp)/Soj (5)
where P^ is the high-low spread t half-hour intervals (i.e. 30t minutes) from the j-th interval and
p" is the average high-low spread computed over the previous 8 days 14 . The difference between
these two variables is normalized by Sq, the spot price just before the beginning of the j-th
interval, and then averaged across all large trades. If the volatility is unaffected by large trades,
then pt=0 for each t.
Although trading volume and volatility may be positively correlated in general, Fishman
and Longstaff (1990) claim that dual (nondual) trading volume and volatility are negatively
(positively) correlated. 15 To check this claim, the above two tests are repeated for both dual
and nondual large trades and for each of the three sample periods.
Finally, we test Grossman's (1989) conjecture that "dual trading creates a reserve pool
of potential brokers" who can switch to servicing customers in high volume periods. Define the
broker participation rate for the i-th time bracket, BPRi, as:
BPRj = number of member transactions in the i-th interval .
total number of member and non member transactions
We interpret this ratio as a proxy for the number of active dual trading brokers in the relevant
148 days is used to account for the bunching of large trades over consecutive days (see
section V.B for a more detailed discussion of this bunching phenomena). Since the number of
such consecutive large volume days never exceeds 9, we expect this average to be representative
of a typical day.
15This result is contained in the July, 1990 version of Fishman and Longstaff(1992).
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time bracket. If dual trading has no effect on brokers' participation rate, then BPRj should be
constant over time for each i. Otherwise, the ratio should be positively correlated with the
relative dual trading volume (i.e. the ratio of dual trading volume to total volume in the i-th
interval).
IV. Liquidity of the S&P 500 Futures Market.
Table 1 reports the effects of large futures trades on the surrounding spot prices, based
on the assumption that the large trades occur towards the beginning of the half-hour brackets16 .
The surrounding spot prices appear to be unaffected, with rt being very close to one for all
values of t for both buyer and seller initiated trades. This indicates that, within, a 30 minute span
around the occurrence of the large futures trades, the underlying spot prices remain virtually
unchanged on average. Further, r
t
does not increase or decrease with t, indicating that the large
futures trades are not motivated by superior information. This is not surprising, since the
underlying asset is not an individual stock but the S&P 500 index and thus, to obtain profitable
trading opportunities, investors would need to have privileged access to market-related
information. These results are consistent with the effect of large options trades on surrounding
stock prices, as reported in Vijh (1990)17 .
Table 2 shows that, for large futures trades, the market price is consistently below its
16The qualitative results do not change if the tests are repeated with the large futures trades
assumed to occur towards the end of the half-hour brackets.
17We have also tested, but not reported, the effect of large futures trades on the surrounding
futures prices. The results are similar to those reported in the paper regarding the spot prices.
They will be available upon request from the authors.
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true theoretical price. The reason may be that it is easier (because of short-selling restrictions
in the spot market) to sell futures and hold a long position in the S&P 500 index, rather than buy
futures and go short in the index. Thus, whenever futures are over-priced, arbitragers can
correct this but the reverse is not equally feasible18 .
Consistent with previous studies, Table 3 shows that volume and volatility are, in
general, positively correlated - large futures trades cause an increase in the high-low spread
relative to its average over the previous eight days. If the large trade occurs in the j-th interval,
then the spread starts to increase from at least interval j -2 (one hour before), peaks in interval
j-1 (half-hour before) and then returns to its average level by interval j +2 (one hour after). At
the five percent level, the increase is significant in interval j-2 for large sales and in interval j-1
for both large purchases and sales.
Summarizing, our results show that the S&P 500 index futures market has great depth
in its capacity to absorb large trades without a significant price impact and without causing a
serious misalignment in futures prices from their true underlying values. Large futures trades
do, however, cause higher price volatility as measured by the high-low spread.
V. The Effect of Dual Trading on Liquidity In The S&P 500 Futures Market.
A. Transactions, Trading Volumes and Broker Participation Rates.
Figures 1-2 and 5-6 illustrate that the trading volume (DTV and NTV) and the number
of transactions (DTT and NTT) for all three periods are high around opening time, decrease
until noon and rise again until the market closes, so that the familiar U-shaped pattern
18We are indebted to Jay Ritter for suggesting this explanation.
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emerges. 19 This is consistent with previous studies (eg. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Wood,
Mclnish and Ord (1985) and Park (1992)). Note from figures 3-4 that the average volume per
transaction also tends to be U-shaped, which implies that relative to the number of transactions,
the dollar volume is more concentrated around the opening and closing times.
Table 4 shows how the sample means of these variables differ across the three regimes.
The rule change reduces the sample mean of DTV by about 6.61%, which is significant at the
five percent level20 . This number is somewhat consistent with the estimate in the CFTC (1989)
study of a reduction in DTV by 7.4% -12% if dual trading were completely eliminated (which
is not the case here)21 . The time bracket most affected by the rule change is the 3-3.30 PM
interval where DTV drops by 11.78%. The crash reduces DTV by a further 40.95%. On the
other hand, NTV is hardly affected by the rule change (a 0.8% reduction) whereas the crash
causes a drop of 35.58%. The reduction in the sample mean of DTT due to the rule change and
the crash are 7.77% (significant at the 2.5% level) and 32.2%, respectively. The corresponding
numbers for NTT are 3.15% and 42.56%. Again, the 3-3.30 PM time interval suffers the most
19The letters on the horizontal axis refer to the time brackets following the conventions of
the CTR data. For example, a is the 8-8.30 AM bracket, b is the 8.30-9 AM bracket and so on.
Summary statistics on the means of the volume and transactions variables, for each half-hour
interval, are available from the authors.
20To test whether the changes in the mean among different sample periods are statistically
significant, the daily averages were regressed on two dummies to isolate the effects of the rule
change and the crash. The coefficient of the crash dummy is highly significant for all the
variables whereas the coefficient of the rule change dummy is never significant for any of the
non-dual trading variables. The rule change dummy coefficient is significant for DTT and
marginally significant for DTV. These results are not reported here but are available from the
authors upon request.
21This shows that our definition of dual trading, though somewhat rough compared to that
of the CFTC, still provides a reasonable basis for our study.
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with a DTT reduction of about 11.94%.
Given that the rule change reduces total dual trading volume and transactions
proportionately, it follows that the average per transaction dual trading volume ADT is relatively
unchanged over the first two periods (a change of +0.87%). In fact, it is of roughly the same
order as the change in ANT (+0.54%). The effect of the crash is more interesting. Whereas
ADT is reduced by 6.03%, ANT actually increases by 20.32%. The reason is that total public
volume is decreased but the shrinkage in the number of public trading transactions is far larger.
Dual trading may enhance market depth by increasing broker participation in high volume
periods. With this in mind, we calculate for each half-hour interval i the Pearson and Spearman
rank correlation coefficients between the broker participation rate BPRj and the ratio of dual
trading volume to total trading volume. The correlation coefficients should be positive by
hypothesis. The results reported in Table 5 show that the coefficients are positive and highly
significant for each time bracket, ranging from 0.71 to 0.86 in the pre-rule change period, from
0.67 to 0.94 in the post-change pre-crash period and from 0.76 to 0.94 in the post-crash period.
The stability of the correlations over the three sample periods suggests that the reduction in dual
trading activity is not sufficient to diminish the provision of liquidity services to brokerage
customers.
B. Information Effect of Dual Trading on Market Depth.
Figures 7-12 plot the frequency distribution of large dual and nondual trades over
different time brackets for each day. Large dual trades appear to have a pronounced U-shaped
pattern. Large nondual trades exhibit a wave pattern with trading concentrated around the
16
opening and early afternoon times, but tapering off towards the end. More importantly, it
appears from figures 8-9 and 11-12 that large trades of both types are bunched together over
successive days, interspersed with relatively quiet days in-between22 . This result is consistent
with the prediction of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) that informed traders bunch with noise
traders in order to hide their information. Although Admati and Pfleiderer were, in their paper,
primarily concerned with intra-day trade variation, their argument applies equally well to the
inter-day variation in trades as well23 .
The spot prices during a 30 minute interval around the occurrence of large dual and non-
dual futures trades do not appear to be affected (see Tables 6 and 7)24 . For example, for the
first sample period, r
t
is 0.99988 for buyer-initiated and 1.00014 for seller-initiated dual trading
at t=-5, i.e. 5 minutes before the beginning of the time bracket in which the large dual trade
occurs. Further, within each sample period, r
t
does not increase or decrease with t. Comparing
between samples one and two, the rule change does not appear to have affected the behavior of
the surrounding stock prices25 . Nor do there appear to be any distinction between large dual
^See section V.D below as to why this is important for our tests.
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It also appears that before the crash, large dual trades were more frequent than large
nondual trades. After the crash, on the other hand, large nondual trades became twice as
frequent as large dual trades. We can provide no explanation for this pattern. Certainly, it
deserves further study.
24 Although these calculations are based on the assumption that the j-th large futures trade
occurs towards the beginning of the j-th interval, the qualitative results do not change if they
occur towards the end of the interval. These latter results are not reported but are available upon
request from the authors.
^Regressing r
t
on two time dummies show that for r+5 , r+10 and r+15 , the crash coefficients
are significant for both large dual purchases and sales. For purchases, the corresponding t-values
are -2.671, -2.712 and -2.627, respectively, whereas for sales they are all greater than 4 in
absolute value. None of the coefficients of the dual trading dummies are statistically significant.
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and nondual trades in this respect.
We also test (but do not report here) the effect of large futures trades on the surrounding
futures prices. The results are very similar to the ones reported above for the spot prices. The
surrounding futures prices are largely unaffected by large dual and nondual trades. A comparison
of the mispricing variable across the three regimes show very little variation, with the t-statistics
on the time dummies being uniformly insignificant.26
C. Inventory Effect of Dual Trading on Market Depth.
Consistent with our findings in the previous section, large dual and nondual trades are
priced systematically below their theoretical prices (see Tables 8 and 9). The magnitude of
mispricing is significant in most cases except seller initiated dual trades for the first and second
periods and buyer initiated non-dual trades in the second period. However, the regression results
(not reported here to conserve space) show that, for both large dual buys and sales, the amount
of mispricing is not affected by the top-step rule but is increased significantly by the crash.
Therefore, it does not appear that the rule change imposed any further inventory carrying costs
on market makers.
D. Effect of Dual Trading on Price Volatility.
Tables 10-11 show how the high-low spread changes relative to the previous day's
26The only exception is that, for large dual sales, the crash increases the statistic s.15
(measuring the effect of a large futures on the futures price 15 minutes before). This has a
positive dummy coefficient with a t value of +2.055. Both the futures price tests and the dummy
regression results are available from the authors upon request.
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median when a large futures trade occurs. According to Fishman and Longstaff (1990), spreads
associated with large dual trades (both buys and sales) should increase after the inception of the
top-step rule. The results are mixed, however. For large dual purchases, the rule change actually
reduces by about 10% the number of trades for which the spread is increased and increases by
about 7% the number for which the spread is decreased from the previous day's median. For
large dual and nondual sales, exactly the opposite result is obtained.
The crash has very little effect on the high-low spread of large buys (dual and nondual).
Surprisingly, the crash reduces the percentage of large sales (dual and nondual) for which the
spread is increased. If the high-low spread is a measure of price volatility, this result flies
against conventional wisdom. One explanation relies on our earlier observation that the bunching
of large volume days increased after the crash (see Figures 8-9 and 11-12). The previous day's
median spread, therefore, is likely to be larger on average after the crash. Of course, a typical
large trade is also associated with a larger absolute value of the spread after the crash (see
Tables 10-11). It appears, though, that the bunching effect dominates.
Since the results may be affected by the bunching of large volume trades (which is also
evident before the crash), we perform the test specified in equation (5). Tables 12-13 report the
results. The changes in the high-low spreads are significantly positive for large dual trades but
not for large nondual trades with few exceptions. More importantly, the effect of the rule change
is not significant. The crash causes the spread to increase significantly for large dual buys and
sells
27
. It is interesting, however, to note that large nondual trades are, in general, unaffected
^The results of dummy regressions for testing the differences among three different time
regimes are available from the authors upon request. Also, when we repeated the tests using the
average spread for the previous day only (instead of the previous 8 days), we found that even
19
by the crash.
VI. Conclusion.
This paper investigates the liquidity of the S&P 500 index futures market and tests
whether the liquidity is affected by the restriction on dual trading activity due to the CME's top-
step rule. In measuring liquidity, we examine various market characteristics such as depth,
trading volume and transactions, high-low spreads of prices and brokers' participation rate. In
estimating depth, we distinguish between any permanent price effects caused by informationally
motivated large trades and temporary mispricings due to the impact of large trades on market
makers' inventory carrying costs.
Our results show that the S&P 500 index futures market is an extremely liquid market.
It has great depth in its capacity to absorb large trades without a significant price impact. Large
futures trades do, however, cause higher price volatility as measured by the high-low spread.
The restriction on dual trading (through the CME's top-step rule) caused some reduction
in both the dual trading volume and the number of transactions while leaving the average order
size per transaction unchanged. However, this reduction in dual trading activity does not appear
to have significantly affected the liquidity of the S&P 500 index futures market. The behavior
of stock and futures prices surrounding large futures trades show no significant impact from the
top-step rule. Similarly, while there exists underpricing of the index futures, we can find no
additional mispricing due to the rule change.
the effect of the crash is insignificant. This lends indirect support to the manner in which we
have defined our statistic.
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We also do not find a support for the suggested negative relationship between dual
trading and price volatility. When we compare the high-low spread associated with a large trade
with the previous day's median spread, the hypothesized relation holds for large dual sales but
not for purchases. When compared to the average spread, however, no significant relationship
is found between volatility and dual trading activity.
We do find that the participation of dual trading brokers is positively correlated with high
volume trading intervals. However, the advent of the top-step rule again in no way diminishes
the role of dual trading brokers in providing customers with liquidity services.
Not surprisingly, the market crash has significant effects on all characteristics of the
market examined in this paper. Since the focus of the paper is on dual trading, we do not
provide a detailed examination of market characteristics around the crash. However, the issue
certainly deserves further study in the future.
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TABLE 1
Stock Prices Surrounding Large Futures Trades
The change in stock prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large futures
trades (defined as the sample mean of ATV plus one standard deviation) . The stock
price reaction is measured by r, = SjS
tj/nSoj, where S,j is the stock price t minutes
from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large trade occurs and n is
the number of large trades. Buy and Sell indicate large purchases and sales.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
r.15
-10 +5 + 10 + 15
Buy- 1.00025 0.99991 0.99955 0.99762 0.99753 0.99762
(.00055) (.00048) (.00043) (.00067) (.0007) (.00081)
N=279 N=279 N=279 N=274 N=274 N=274
Sell 0.99986 0.99975 0.99959 0.99869 0.99863 0.99876
(.00038) (.00034) (.0003) (.00049) (.00051) (.00038)
N=457 N=457 N=457 N=448 N=448 N=448
TABLE 2
Mispricing In Futures Prices Surrounding Large Futures Trades
The mispricing variable for the j-th large trade is measured by xgT = [FljT - S^e'**
axr-Oj/S^ where FyT is the market futures price of an index expiring at time T and
Sy is the index value. The averaging mispricing is given by m,T 2j.°xlT/n, where
n is the number of large trades, t takes on values within the 30 minute window
surrounding large trades (defined as the sample mean of ATV plus one standard
deviation). Buy and Sell indicate large purchases and sales. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
r.,5 r.io r.5 r r +5 r + io r + i 5
Buy -.0099
(.002)
N=279
-.0097
(.002)
N=279
-.0099
(.002)
N=279
-.01
(.002)
N=279
-.0086
(.002)
N=274
-.0097
(.002)
N=274
-.0091
(.002)
N=274
Sell -.006
(.001)
N=425
-.0063
(.001)
N=425
-.0062
(.001)
N=425
-.0062
(.001)
N=425
-.0056
(.001)
N=416
-.0061
(.001)
N=416
-.0057
(.001)
N=416
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TABLE 3
High-low Spread Relative To Average For Large Futures Trades
The high-low price spread Pj for the j-th large trade is compared to its average
over the previous 8 days. The reported statistic is p,=Sj_°[Pij - PJ/Sq, where P^ is
the high-low price spread t intervals from the interval in which j-th large
futures trade occurred and S^ is the index value at t=0. n is the number of large
trades, t takes on values from -2 to +2, i.e. two half-hour time intervals before
and after the j-th interval. Buy and Sell indicate large purchases and sales.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of
observations
.
P-2 P-i Po P+i P + 2
Buy- 0.00229
(.0012)
N=210
0.00249
(.001)
N=257
0.0012
(.00092)
N=257
0.0
(.0009)
N=250
0.00061
(.0009)
N=253
Sell 0.00175
(.00079)
N=3 38
0.00196
(.00064)
N=4 22
0.00062
(.00059)
N=422
0.0
(.00059)
N=4 09
0.00048
(.0006)
N=413
TABLE 4
SAMPLE MEANS FOR TRANSACTIONS AND TRADING VOLUMES
The sample means for trading volume (DTV and NTV) , number of transactions (DTT and NTT), and
average volume per transaction (ADT and ANT) for each of three sample periods. Sample period
1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post- A
change post-crash period. N gives the total number of observations for each sample period. C
Periodl
(N=248)
Period2
(N=83)
Period3
(N=172)
DTV 92614.92 86491.57 51076.52
NTV 49585.36 49188.06 31690.84
DTT 27202.35 25091.17 17011.68
NTT 13522.85 13096.86 7522.20
ADT 3.4478 3.4791 3.2668
ANT 3.7188 3.7436 4.5014
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TABLE 5
BROKER PARTICIPATION RATE
The Pearson (P;) and the Spearman (S,) rank correlation coeffcients for sample period
^i between the relative number of dual trading transactions BPR and the relative dual
trading volume RDT for each time interval. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change
period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash
period. BPR is defined as DTT/ (DTT+NTT) and RDT is defined as DTV/ (DTV+NTV) . N gives
the total number of observations for each sample period. The 12-12. 30PM interval is
omitted as it contains minimal trading activity.
SI
(N=248)
S2
(N=83)
S3
(N=172)
PI
(N=248)
P2
(N=83)
P3
(N=172)
9-9. 30AM 0.8504 0.8734 0.8634 0.8371 0.8429 0.8551
9.30-10AM 0.7744 0.9215 0.8431 0.7760 0.8694 0.7580
10-10. 30AM 0.7106 0.9229 0.8633 0.7356 0.8762 0.7195
10.30-11AM 0.7261 0.7525 0.8165 0.7797 0.8354 0.7861
11-11. 30AM 0.8176 0.9453 0.8507 0.7669 0.8389 0.7857
11.30-12PM 0.7914 0.8148 0.7703 0.7781 0.8069 0.7678
12.30-1PM 0.8234 0.8967 0.8167 0.8283 0.8377 0.7998
1-1. 30PM 0.7839 0.8534 0.8832 0.7406 0.8319 0.7425
1.30-2PM 0.8534 0.7790 0.8729 0.8253 0.7571 0.8228
2-2. 30PM 0.7994 0.7681 0.8613 0.7594 0.7700 0.8143
2.30-3PM 0.8611 0.8992 0.8545 0.8139 0.8730 0.7547
3-3. 30PM 0.8027 0.8202 0.9178 0.8100 0.7921 0.8078
3.30-4PM 0.8294 0.9198 0.9461 0.7933 0.8819 0.7541
4-4. 30PM 0.7454 0.6666 0.8487 0.7458 0.7078 0.7422
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TABLE 6
Stock Prices Surrounding Large Dual Trades
The change in stock prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large dual trades
(defined as the sample mean of ADTV plus one standard deviation) for each sample
period. The stock price reaction is measured by r, EjS
tj/nSqj, where Sg is the stock
price t minutes from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large dual trade
occurs and n is the number of large dual trades. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate large dual
purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change period,
2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
r.i5 1.00041
(.00033)
N=155
0.99953
(.00060)
N=52
1.00033
(.00104)
N=131
1.00020
(.00020)
N=3 03
0.99973
(.00037)
N=103
1.00005
(.00076)
N=192
r.io 1.00003
(.00029)
N=155
0.99930
(.00054)
N=52
1.00001
(.00092)
N=131
1.00015
(.00018)
N=3 03
0.99974
(.00033)
N=103
0.99993
(.00067)
N=192
r.s 0.99988
(.00022)
N=155
0.99932
(.00048)
N=52
0.99946
(.00084)
N=131
1.00014
(.00015)
N=303
0.99984
(.00028)
N=103
0.99949
(.0006)
N=192
rQ 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
r +5 0.99922
(.00039)
N=150
0.99828
(.00077)
N=49
0.99603
(.00130)
N=126
1.00020
(.00024)
N=295
0.99970
(.00043)
N=101
0.99707
(.00095)
N=189
r +io 0.99920
(.00043)
N=150
0.99809
(.00082)
N=49
0.99582
(.00135)
N=126
1.00020
(.00025)
N=295
0.99960
(.00045)
N=101
0.99689
(.00098)
N=189
r + ,5 0.99918
(.00047)
N=150
0.99800
(.00089)
N=49
0.99573
(.00141)
N=126
1.00024
(.00027)
N=295
0.99968
(.00047)
N=101
0.99670
(.00103)
N=189
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TABLE 7
stock Prices Surrounding Large Nondual Trades
The change in stock prices for the 30 minute window surrounding large non-dual trades
J defined as the sample mean of ANTV plus one standard deviation) for each sample
; period. The stock price reaction is measured by r, = EjS^/nSqj, where S
tj is the stock
price t minutes from the beginning of the time bracket when the j-th large non-dual
trade occurs and n is the number of large non-dual trades. Buy'i' and Sell x i' indicate
large nondual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule
change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-
crash period. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
r.is 1.00050
(.00045)
N=80
1.00115
(.00050)
N=2 6
0.99981
(.00061)
N=270
0.99975
(.00032)
N=157
1.00003
(.00038)
N=67
0.99991
(.00053)
N=308
r.io 1.00035
(.00045)
N=8
1.00087
(.00049)
N=2 6
0.99964
(.00054)
N=27
0.99968
(.00028)
N=157
0.99996
(.00029)
N=67
0.99984
(.00047)
N=308
r-s 1.00018
(.00041)
N=80
1.00038
( .00037)
N=2 6
0.99929
(.00049)
N=270
0.99964
(.00024)
N=157
0.99989
(.00020)
N=67
0.99958
(.00043)
N=308
r 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
r +5 1.00047
(.00045)
N=80
0.99973
(.00085)
N=2 6
0.99831
(.00079)
N=2 69
0.99961
(.00036)
N=154
0.99924
(.00054)
N=67
0.99877
(.00073)
N=3 06
r + 10 1.00027
(.00049)
N=80
0.99959
(.00101)
N=2 6
0.99829
(.00082)
N=269
0.99946
(.00039)
N=154
0.99907
(.00059)
N=67
0.99868
(.00075)
N=3 06
r+is 0.99987
(.00061)
N=80
0.99931
(.00115)
N=2 6
0.99864
(.00092)
N=2 69
0.99947
(.00042)
N=154
0.99890
(.00061)
N=67
0.99904
(.00084)
N=3 06
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TABLE 8
Mispricing In Futures Prices Surrounding Large Dual Trades
The mispricing variable for the j-th large trade is measured as x,jT = [Fljr - S tje (Ml)0r",) ] /Sq,,
where F,jT is the market futures price of an index expiring at time T and S tj is the index
value. The averaging mispricing is given by m,T = H^x^/n, where n is the number of
large trades, t takes on values within the 30 minute window surrounding large dual
trades (defined as the sample mean of ADTV plus one standard deviation). Buy'i' and
Sell'i' indicate large dual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1
is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the
post-change post-crash period. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. N indicates
the number of observations.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
m
-15 -.00189
(.00043)
N=154
-.002
(.00066)
N=52
-.01384
(.00337)
N=131
-.00035
(.00033)
N=2 88
-.00065
(.0005)
N=95
-.01180
(.00256)
N=173
m
-io -.00146
(.00038)
N=154
-.00193
(.00064)
N=52
-.01407
(.00340)
N=131
-.00036
(.00032)
N=2 88
-.00069
(.00052)
N=95
-.01236
(.00258)
N=173
m
-5 -.00166
(.00036)
N=154
-.00146
(.00053)
N=52
-.01406
(.00355)
N=131
-.00046
(.00031)
N=288
-.00046
(.00047)
N=95
-.01223
(.00268)
N=173
% -.00162
(.00049)
N=154
-.00183
(.00062)
N=52
-.01472
(.00341)
N=131
-.00039
(.00031)
N=288
-.00070
(.0005)
N=95
-.01206
(.00255)
N=173
m+5 -.00138
(.00038)
N=149
-.00168
(.00058)
N=49
-.01200
(.00352)
N=126
-.00036
(.00032)
N=280
-.00048
(.0005)
N=95
-.01020
(.00256)
N=170
m+io -.00168
(.00037)
N=149
-.00191
(.00065)
N=49
-.01363
(.00336)
N=12 6
-.00034
(.00033)
N=280
-.00037
(.00052)
N=95
-.01161
(.00242)
N=170
m + 15 -.00135
(.00049)
N=149
-.00172
(.00084)
N=49
-.01320
(.00325)
N=12 6
-.00032
(.00038)
N=280
-.00005
(.00054)
N=95
-.01128
(.00232)
N=170
TABLE 9
Mispricing In Futures Prices Surrounding Large Nondual Trades
The mispricing variable for the j-th large futures trade is measured as xyT = [FyT - S^e'*"
<JKT'*)
] / Sqj , where F,jT is the market futures price of an index expiring at time T and S,j is
^he index value. The average mispricing over all large trades is given by m,T = Ej_?x,jT/n,
where n is the number of large trades, t takes on values within the 30 minute window
surrounding large nondual trades (defined as the sample mean of ANTV plus one standard
deviation). Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate large nondual purchases and sales for sample
period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-
crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period. Standard errors are reported
in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
m
-15 -.00154
(.00071)
N=75
-.00012
(.00153)
N=24
-.00818
(.00189)
N=2 49
-.00278
(.00036)
N=150
-.00159
(.00063)
N=64
-.00639
(.00175)
N=282
m
-io -.00158
(.00069)
N=75
-.00072
(.00160)
N=2 4
-.00863
(.00190)
N=2 49
-.00271
(.00035)
N=150
-.00171
(.00064)
N=64
-.00670
(.00176)
N=2 82
n-5 -.00135
(.0007)
N=75
-.00007
(.00139)
N=24
-.00851
(.0020)
N=24 9
-.00266
(.00034)
N=150
-.00121
(.00057)
N=64
-.00658
(.00182)
N=282
ify -.00128
(.0007)
N=75
-.00025
(.00146)
N=24
-.00852
(.00188)
N=249
-.00273
(.00034)
N=150
-.00145
(.00058)
N=64
-.00656
(.00174)
N=282
m+5 -.00158
(.00071)
N=75
.00020
(.00136)
N=2 4
-.00788
(.00190)
N=249
-.00292
(.00035)
N=147
-.00106
(.00057)
N=64
-.00637
(.00178)
N=28
m +io -.00153
(.00071)
N=75
-.00007
(.00144)
N=24
-.00867
(.00186)
N=249
-.00287
(.00035)
N=147
-.00117
(.00059)
N=64
-.00684
(.00171)
N=28
m+15 -.00136
(.00087)
N=75
-.00019
(.00157)
N=2 4
-.00837
(.00172)
N=249
-.00283
(.00038)
N=147
-.0009
(.00062)
N=64
-.00658
(.00161)
N=280
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TABLE 10
CHANGE IN HIGH-LOW SPREAD FOR PURCHASES
The high-low spread for the j-th large buy Pj is compared to the median of the previous
day's high-low spreads. PGDB(PLDB) gives the percentage of times that Pj exceeds (is
below) the previous days' median for large dual buys. PEDB gives the percentage times
the spread does not change. PGNDB, PENDB and PLNDB refer to nondual buys. 1 is the pre-
rule change period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change
post-crash period. Standard errors are in parenthesis. N gives the total number of
observations for each sample period.
Periodl Period2 Period3
PGDB 64.09
(0.04)
N=142
54.55
(0.076)
N=44
53.91
(0.047)
N=115
PEDB 3.52
(0.016)
N=142
0.00
(0.0)
N=44
3.48
(0.017)
N=115
PLDB 32.39
(0.039)
N=142
45.46
(0.076)
N=44
42.61
(0.046)
N=115
PGNDB 44.87
(0.057)
N=78
48.00
(0.102)
N=25
47.89
(0.031)
N=261
PENDB 4.95
(0.022)
N=78
0.00
(0.00)
N=25
5.75
(0.014)
N=2 61
PLNDB 51.28
(0.057)
N=78
52.00
(0.102)
N=2 5
46.36
(0.031)
N=2 61
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TABLE 11
CHANGE IN HIGH-LOW SPREAD FOR SALES
The high-low spread for the j-th large sale Pj is compared to the median of the previous day's
high-low spreads. PGDS(PLDS) gives the percentage of times that Pj exceeds (is below) the
\previous days' median for dual sales. PEDS gives the percentage times the spread does not
'change. NDS refer to nondual sales. 1 is the pre-rule change period, 2 is the post-change but
pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period. Standard errors are
parenthesis. N gives the total number of observations for each sample period.
in
Periodl Period2 Period3
PGDS 54.78
(0.03)
N=272
63.83
(0.05)
N=94
48.57
(0.038)
N=175
PEDS 4.04
(0.012)
N=2 72
2.13
(0.015)
N=94
4.57
(0.016)
N=175
PLDS 41.18
(0.03)
N=272
34.04
(0.049)
N=94
46.86
(0.038)
N=175
PGNDS 45.21
(0.041)
.
N=146
53.85
(0.062)
N=94
45.86
(0.029)
N=175
PENDS 4.80
(0.018)
N=146
1.54
(0.015)
N=94
4.48
(0.012)
N=175
PLNDS 50.00
(0.042)
N=146
44.62
(0.062)
N=94
49.66
(0.029)
N=175
I
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TABLE 12
High-low Spread Relative To Average For Large Dual Trades
The high-low price spread Pj for the j-th large trade is compared to its average over the
previous 8 days. The reported statistic is p,=2j_?[P
tj
- 7]/S^, where P
(j
is the high-low price
spread t intervals from the interval in which j-th large futures trade occurred and Sq= is the
index value at t=0. n is the number of large trades, t takes on values from -2 to +2, i.e.
two half-hour time intervals before and after the j-th interval. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate
large dual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change
period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
Buyl Buy2 Buy3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
P-2 0.00289
(.00055)
N=lll
0.00215
(.00069)
N=3 5
0.01029
(.0027)
N=100
0.00209
(.00034)
N=2 06
0.00157
(.00036)
N=71
0.00656
(.00192)
N=150
P-i 0.00326
(.00046)
N=142
0.00233
(.00056)
N=44
0.01083
(.00234)
N=115
0.00208
(.00027)
N=269
0.00189
(.00031)
N=94
0.00617
(.00168)
N=175
Po 0.00179
(.00041)
N=142
0.0014
(.00046)
N=44
0.00902
(.00215)
N=115
0.00073
(.00023)
N=2 69
0.00122
(.00038)
N=94
0.00424
(.00155)
N=175
P+i 0.00125
(.00038)
N=141
0.00264
(.00082)
N=41
0.00904
(.00223)
N=112
0.00039
(.00023)
N=2 63
0.00113
(.00049)
N=91
0.00425
(.0016)
N=172
P+2 0.00087
(.00027)
N=137
0.00242
(.00111)
N=40
0.00889
(.00211)
N=109
0.00013
(.00017)
N=261
0.00129
(.00062)
N=88
0.00346
(.00151)
N=170
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TABLE 13
High-low Spread Relative To Average For Large Nondual Trades
The high-low price spread Pj for the j-th large trade is compared to its average over the
previous 8 days. The reported statistic is pt=Ej_°[P tj - PJ/Sq, where Ptj is the high-low price
Spread t intervals from the interval in which j-th large futures trade occurred and S^ is the
index value at t=0. n is the number of large trades, t takes on values from -2 to +2, i.e.
two half-hour time intervals before and after the j-th interval. Buy'i' and Sell'i' indicate
large nondual purchases and sales for sample period i. Sample period 1 is the pre-rule change
period, 2 is the post-change but pre-crash period and 3 is the post-change post-crash period.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. N indicates the number of observations.
Buyl Buy2 Buy 3 Selll Sell2 Sell3
P-2 0.00091
(.00045)
N=71
0.0006
(.00063)
N=2 3
0.00237
(.0014)
N=222
0.0016
(.00049)
N=125
0.00166
(.00052)
N=50
0.00204
(.00126)
N=2 4 8
P-i 0.00057
(.00045)
N=77
0.00099
(.0007)
N=25
0.00234
(.0012)
N=261
0.0015
(.00036)
N=146
0.00113
(.00039)
N=65
0.00227
(.00109)
N=2 90
Po 0.00009
(.00032)
N=77
0.00161
(.00131)
N=25
0.00126
(.00112)
N=261
0.00069
(.0003)
N=146
0.00133
(.00057)
N=65
0.00106
(.001)
N=290
P + i 0.00054
(.00055)
N=76
0.00218
(.00166)
N=25
0.00074
(.00114)
N=259
0.00065
(.00042)
N=14 6
0.00169
(.00073)
N=64
0.0008
(.00104)
N=2 85
P+2 0.00005
(.00032)
N=73
-.00039
(.00029)
N=24
0.00033
(.0011)
N=255
0.00052
(.00026)
N=145
0.00182
(.02905)
N=64
0.0005
(.001)
N=279
I
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Figure 1
Total Dual Trading Volume
for Different Time Brackets
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Figure 2
Total Non-Dual Trading Volume
for Different Time Brackets
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Figure 5
Total Number of Dual Trading Transactions
for Different Time Brackets
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Figure 6
Total Number of Non-Dual Trading Transactions
for Different Time Brackets
Figure 7
Intraday Variation of Large Purchases
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Daily Variation In Large Dual Buys
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Daily Variation In Large Nondual Buys
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Intraday Variation of Large Sales
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Daily Variation In Large Dual Sales
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